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An Exploratory Study of US Acquirers’ Market Performance: Pre- 
versus Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Abstract
Purpose – Motivated by the findings of Bhabra and Hossain (2017) that highlight an improvement 
in US market performance in the post-SOX period, we investigate how this change varies with the 
methods of payment used for the deals. 
Design/methodology/approach – Deductive in nature and using an event study approach, this 
paper uses a sample of 675 deals between 1999 and 2006 to test three research hypotheses in a 
pre-post setting.
Findings – Results show that at the aggregate level, there is a significant improvement in the 
market performance of US acquirers around the announcement day in the aftermath of the passage 
of SOX 2002. Considered separately, both US stock acquirers and cash acquirers did not 
experience any significant improvement in market performance in the post-SOX period. These 
results are robust to controlling for governance, firm and deal variables, as well as industry and 
year fixed effects.
Research limitations – Exploratory in nature, the results are to be interpreted in light of the sample 
size and the period under investigation.
Practical implications – The results provide evidence for regulators and legislators on the 
contribution of SOX 2002 to curbing managerial misconduct. Significant improvement in the 
market performance also signals more confidence in managerial decisions and a reduction in 
agency problems. The insignificant change in stock acquirers’ market performance can be an 
indication that policymakers should exert more efforts to improve shareholders' confidence in the 
quality of disclosure.
Originality/value – This investigation provides unique insights on whether SOX has been 
effective in mitigating mispricing concerns associated with stock-financed acquisitions and 
whether it was effective in moderating the governance mechanism associated with cash-financed 
acquisitions.
Keywords US Acquirers’ Market Performance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Agency Theory, Signaling 
Theory, Stock acquisitions, Cash acquisitions.
Paper type – Research paper.
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An Exploratory Study of US Acquirers’ Market Performance: Pre- 
versus Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are powerful expansion strategies adopted by corporations. The 
related literature informs that these events happen in waves clustered after major macro-economic 
and political events, and are driven by various motives, in particular, surviving fierce market 
rivalry, diversification, and synergies (Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Bena and Li, 2014; Dos Santos et 
al., 2008). Despite these promised benefits, the US market reaction to these events around the 
announcement period has been negative, possibly indicating concerns about the true motives 
behind these acquisitions (Walker, 2000; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006; Masulis et al., 2007; 
Antoniou et al., 2007; Alexandridis et al., 2010; Jory and Ngo, 2011; Chronopoulos et al., 2013). 
Firth (1980) suggests that these negative returns reflect investors’ perception that the bid is too 
expensive and that its costs outweigh its potential synergy benefits; they might as well reflect 
investors’ fears that managers are engaging in M&A strategies for self-serving purposes (Baumol, 
1959; Mueller, 1969; Penrose, 1959; and Williamson, 1964) or as a result of a paradigm conflict 
(Adra and Menassa, 2019). Such fears are accentuated by major M&A failures (for example the 
merger of America Online and Time Warmer) and a record of corporate scandals (such as Enron 
and WorldCom) that cast major doubts on the ethicality of managerial conduct. Related concerns 
are not limited to M&A announcements per se, but rather extend to the means of financing these 
acquisitions. From this perspective, doubts are particularly manifested in investors’ negative 
reaction to stock-financed acquisitions signaling fears of stock mispricing. According to the 
Signaling theory, investors can extract information (signals) from the financing method of the 
M&A; when corporations choose to finance acquisitions by stocks, they could be signaling that 
their stocks are overvalued (Yook, 2003). The evidence on shareholders’ concerns about 
managerial misconduct and stock mispricing highlights possible threats to countries’ financial and 
economic development. For instance, strong empirical evidence suggest that investor sentiment 
and trust increase aggregate investments in the market (Arif and Lee, 2014; Zak and Knack, 2001; 
Guiso et al., 2008); conversely, doubts about the fair valuation of stocks and the lack of trust 
underline the presence of information opacity, a major hurdle for an effective functioning of stock 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting3
markets that can massively affect investors’ confidence and lead to the migration of investments 
(Gurun et al., 2018). 
Motivated by the importance of restoring investors’ confidence in financial markets and 
mitigating agency concerns, the US Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter 
SOX 2002 or SOX). Considered as one of the strictest acts in the history of USA since the 
implementation of the Securities Act of 1933-1934, this major regulatory intervention aims at 
regulating the auditing profession and enforcing laws against managerial fraud, thus curbing 
managerial misconduct and improving the transparency of financial markets. In this context, SOX 
requires managers to provide assurance that financial reports do not include any omissions or 
misleading materials (Lobo and Zhou, 2010), and holds the chief executive and financial officers 
responsible for any non-compliance with the Act’s guidelines. Such stipulations intend to improve 
corporate governance and are considered a precedent in the history of federal legislation (Romano, 
2005). SOX also grants particular emphasis to the transparency of financial reporting and requires 
auditors to give formal advice on the quality of financial reports in an attempt to provide early 
alerts on possible misreporting of financial information.
The economic consequences of the implementation of SOX 2002 were investigated by many 
scholars. By examining the market reaction to related legislative events before and after the 
passage of the Act, Zhang (2007) finds that investors have reacted negatively to such 
announcements. He suggests that restrictions imposed on non-auditing services are costly and that 
SOX has not achieved its objectives. Similarly, Rice et al. (2015) note that restatements under 
section 4041 are unreliable and mislead investment decisions. Conversely, Aghimien (2010) 
suggests that, although SOX has created additional costs, it has proven to have a favorable effect 
on investors' confidence, while Andrade et al. (2014) observe a reduction in opacity following its 
adoption. From a related angle, Bartov and Cohen (2009) observe a statistically significant 
decrease in expectation management - a means of earnings management - in the post-SOX period 
in comparison with the period of the 1990s.
Therefore, years after its adoption, the effectiveness of SOX remains debatable. In the context 
of M&A, a recent study by Mughal et al. (2021) provides evidence of real activity management in 
the pre- and post-SOX periods of the target firms, which is negatively associated with the short-
1 Section 404 requires firms to publish a report mentioning that the management insures an adequate level of internal 
control supported by an effective control structure.





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting4
term performance of targets and the long-term performance of acquirers. In a related context, 
Bhabra and Hossain (2017) find that due to the improved transparency, increased governance, and 
the reduction in managerial risk, the US acquirers’ market performance has improved in the post-
SOX period. Franks et al. (1991), Yook (2003), Oler (2008), and Alexandridis et al. (2010) 
consider the effect of means of financing M&A and note a positive market reaction to cash 
financed acquisitions.
Our paper contributes to several aspects of the literature. At the outset, we contribute to the 
literature on SOX by providing evidence on whether this reform is effective at boosting investors’ 
confidence in managerial decision making in the context of M&A announcements. If SOX has 
been effective in achieving its aims of curbing managerial misconduct (Bartov and Cohen, 2009), 
it is expected that investors are more confident that concerns related to managerial conduct are 
dealt with. Accordingly, if SOX is effective in improving the quality of financial reports, the 
negative performance of US acquirers is expected to be lessened. Moreover, we expand this 
literature by extending Bhabra and Hossain (2017) analysis to investigate the change in stock and 
cash acquirers’ market performance after the adoption of SOX. We argue that if shareholders’ 
concerns about stock overvaluation is mitigated by the SOX-induced enhanced transparency of 
corporate information, the adverse market reaction to stock financed acquisitions should also be 
lessened. We also contribute to the growing evidence on the favorable market reaction to cash 
financed acquisitions; in this line, we argue that this favorable reaction is mainly due to the 
favorable governance role that cash acquisitions play in reducing the amount of cash available to 
be spent on managerial utility maximization activities. In this context, we investigate the change 
in cash acquirers’ market performance following the adoption of SOX. It would be intuitive to 
study how such a governance intervention affects a self-governing mechanism of cash financed 
acquisitions. If SOX has been effective, we would expect the market performance of US cash 
acquirers to decrease in the post-SOX period in light of the overall improved governance imposed 
by SOX. In other words, if SOX improves the overall governance of the market, investors would 
not perceive, or perceive to a lower extent, cash-financed acquisitions as favorable activities that 
compensate the lack of governance.
Consistent with Bhabra and Hossain (2017), we find that the market performance has improved 
in the post-SOX period, possibly due to increased investors’ confidence in managerial conduct 
brought about by the adoption of SOX. However, when we limit our focus to stock-financed 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting5
acquisitions, we find an insignificant improvement in performance. These insignificant changes 
can be interpreted in the light of Rice et al. (2015) observation of the unreliability of SOX reports 
resulting in creating additional confusion for investors. Specifically, we provide unique evidence 
on whether SOX is effective in mitigating shareholders’ concerns about stock overvaluation 
associated with stock-financed acquisitions, in the light of SOX sections aiming at improving the 
transparency of financial reports. We show that SOX is more effective in mitigating agency 
problems by imposing harsh penalties on managerial misconduct than in alleviating mispricing 
concerns where unintended confusion among investors might have been caused by section 404 
(Rice et al., 2015). Moreover, we find no change in the cash acquirers’ market performance which 
can indicate that investors did not perceive agency concerns associated with this type of acquisition 
to be mitigated by SOX. These results are robust to a series of robustness tests such as year and 
industry fixed effects and controlling for governance and bid related variables. On the 
practical/policy level, our results provide consequential evidence for policy makers on the 
effectiveness of regulatory efforts in handling market imperfections and sheds the light on possible 
market confusion due to vagueness of some SOX requirements or lack of compliance.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical underpinnings 
of the study. Section 3 reviews the literature and explains how the hypotheses are developed. 
Section 4 discusses the methodology used including the sample selection and market performance 
models and measures. Section 5 presents the univariate and multivariate results. Section 6 presents 
the robustness tests and investigates the major sources of endogeneity. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework 
The neoclassical theories suggest the existence of rational reasons for firms to undertake M&A 
activities. From this angle, firms that own rare and scarce assets attempt to exploit these assets by 
acquiring other firms. It follows that these firms become more valuable than firms that do not 
engage in such activities (Arikan and Stulz, 2016). The same neoclassical models suggest that 
acquisitions increase the value of shareholders. For instance, diversification creates internal capital 
sources that allow better allocation of capital than if the divisions were standalone firms.  These 
internal capital connections give the firm access to information which is not available to outsiders 
and help in the management of cash flow across different divisions (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
2015; Matvos and Seru, 2014). Nevertheless, and from an Agency perspective, when the owner 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting6
(principal) delegates a decision-making role to one or more persons (agents), an agency issue might 
arise. In other terms, assuming that both parties are utility maximizers, this theory suggests that 
managers might not act in the best interest of owners. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
the Agency theory is represented by the possibility that managers might engage in acquisitions for 
self-serving purposes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Conversely, if the firm does not diversify, it 
would not grow or might even decrease in size (Denis et al., 1997) thus affecting managers’ 
benefits adversely. Empirically, these agency concerns are demonstrated by a negative market 
reaction to acquisition announcements by acquirers’ shareholders (Smith and Kim, 1994; Walker 
2000; Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 2007).
Empirical studies have also shown significant differences in the market reaction between 
stock-financed and cash-financed M&A activities (Yook, 2003; Louis, 2004; Adra and 
Barbopoulos, 2018 and Adra and Barbopoulos, 2019). This differential is usually explained by the 
possible presence of information asymmetry (Signaling theory) and the effect of debt financing. 
In this respect, the market performance of stock acquirers reflects a negative market reaction to 
acquisition announcements that is possibly due to signals sent to investors that the stocks are 
overvalued (Yook, 2003). In contrast to stock acquirers, cash acquirers witness favorable reaction 
to the acquisition announcement day. This this because when a company decides to cash finance 
an acquisition, it can either uses hoarded cash or it can borrow. In this line, Jensen (1986) stresses 
the role of debt in motivating managers to act efficiently. The author argues that issuing debt 
reduces the cost of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow to be spent at the discretion of 
managers. This would reduce the agency costs and avoid bankruptcy.
Considering the above discussion, this study positions the negative market reaction to 
acquisition announcements as reflection of acquires’ shareholders fears that the true motives of 
these corporate activities deviate from the neoclassical motives of M&A. We therefore use the 
Agency theory as a framework to investigate the change in US acquirer’s performance after the 
adoption of SOX in view of highlighting the probable role played by this Act in enhancing the 
quality of financial reports and boosting investors’ confidence. Moreover, the Signaling theory 
and Debt perspectives are used to investigate and understand the differential between stock-
financed and cash-financed M&A activities in the context of SOX. It also remains that the 
estimation of abnormal stock price movement around a certain event (here M&A) is grounded in 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting7
the Efficient Market Hypothesis assuming that stock prices compound all existing information, 
corporate announcements, and news (Fama, 1991; Gandhi et al., 2013).
3. Hypotheses Development 
The conventional corporate objective of managers is to maximize the wealth of shareholders (Jones 
and Felps, 2013). However, empirical research has markedly reflected shareholders’ fears that 
acquisitions can be also driven by managerial self-interest to increase their own wealth, or hubris 
where they commit mistakes in evaluating the values of targets and decide to engage in activities 
that do not lead to synergetic gains (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mishkin, 2010). For instance, 
Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate that over a five-day event window around the bid announcement, 
the mean and median Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) values for US acquirers are 
significantly negative (-1.484% and -1.194% respectively; p=0.01). Similarly, using a sample of 
4173 bids and 618 distinct UK acquirers, Antoniou et al. (2007) demonstrate that shareholders of 
UK acquirers of public targets witness significant negative Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR) over a five-day period around the announcement day (-1.16%). Similar evidence of 
negative market performance is also reported in a considerable number of other studies (see for 
example Walker, 2000; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2007; Masulis et al., 2007; 
Alexandridis et al., 2010; Jory and Ngo, 2011; Chronopoulos et al., 2013). Boubaker and Hamza 
(2014) investigate the relationship between short term and long-term performance of acquirers. 
They find that on the short term, acquirers suffer negative returns but enjoy positive returns on the 
long run. Moreover, the authors find that only positive short-term performance can predict the 
long-term performance of acquirers. Kim et al. (2021) find that acquisitions of innovative targets 
yield positive returns for acquirers around the announcement day which can persist for a longer 
period if the acquirers are familiar with the targets industry. 
From a different but related angle, research on the market performance of acquirers around the 
announcement day highlight a stock-cash return differential. In this context, Yook (2003) 
investigates the role of the Signaling theory and the Benefit of Debt theory in explaining this return 
differential in the US. His findings show that the cumulative median abnormal return for cash 
acquirers exhibits an insignificant value of -0.71% over the period covering the announcement day 
and the day prior to it. However, CAR for stock acquirers shows a significant value of -1.51%. He 
also notes that wealth creation in cash acquisitions depends on the merits that debt-financing 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting8
provides whereas the wealth creation in stock acquisitions depends on the synergy effects. Louis 
(2004) shows that over a three-day event window around the announcement, US stock acquirers 
suffer from statistically significant median cumulative abnormal returns of -2.28%, whereas cash 
acquirers witness a significant median CAR value of 0.44%. Furthermore, Oler (2008) shows that 
the mean announcement Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) for non-stock US acquirers 
and stock acquirers are -1.3% and -3.1% respectively where both values are significant at 1% level. 
In the context of earnout financing, where the payment of the of the acquisition is made by an 
upfront payment to the target at the time of the acquisition and the complementary payment is 
dependent on the post-acquisition announcement performance, Barbopoulos et al. (2018) find that 
earnout deals’ gains for US acquirers depends on the payment method and that the value creation  
from earnouts for first time cross border acquisitions is higher than that of domestic bids financed 
using either stock or cash.
Market performance of acquirers around the announcement day is also prone to the positive or 
negative effect of market events. In this line, the passage of SOX 2002 is expected to have 
important implications on various aspects of the business environment, in particular on US 
acquirers’ market performance. This Act has captured the interest of scholars from various 
academic disciplines (Iliev, 2010) who investigated its effect on different aspects of investors’ 
welfare such as the ethical conduct of firms and corporate governance, earnings management, the 
investment environment, investor confidence and the quality of disclosure. In the context of 
corporate governance and ethics, studies show evidence of improved ethical conduct and 
governance practices of firms (Orin, 2008; Valenti, 2008). The favorable effect of SOX was also 
represented by a statistically significant decrease in expectation management in the post-SOX 
period compared to the period of the 1990s, suggesting that managerial activities have shifted from 
expectation management after the implementation of the Act (Bartov and Cohen 2009). Chen and 
Huang (2013) examine the effect of SOX on the pre-purchase earning management and its 
relationship with post-repurchases performance. They show that the significant negative relation 
between the pre-repurchase abnormal accruals and the post-repurchase performance is no more 
evident in the post-SOX period. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that SOX has improved the 
investment environment. For instance, Sun et al. (2014) find that the effect of investment 
opportunity on firms’ performance is significantly greater after the passage of SOX and that the 
Act has lessened the effect of board independence on the relation between investment opportunities 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting9
and firm performance. From an international perspective, Abdioglu et al. (2015) show that the 
improvement of the quality of corporate disclosures and the decrease in the information asymmetry 
after the passage of SOX 2002 lead to the increase in the foreign international investment. 
On the other hand, several studies reported negative consequences of SOX adoption; for 
instance, Deng et al. (2012) suggest that SOX has created benefits of reducing costs of capital and 
audit failure but has also reduced the level of profitable investments. Moreover, Brown and 
Nyonna (2015) examine the change in delisting activity from US exchanges over a period of five 
years after the passage of SOX and find that SOX increases the costs of compliance leading to 
increased delisting of international companies from US stock exchanges.  Despite the additional 
costs created by the adoption of SOX, the promised benefits of this reform has been positively 
received by investors who exhibited higher confidence in the post-SOX period (Aghimien , 2010). 
Using stock returns and trading volume, Burks (2011) investigates the conjecture that SOX has 
confused investors and finds no evidence that investors are disordered by SOX related restatements 
in the post-SOX period.
Thus, if SOX is effective at disciplining managerial conduct, it is expected to drive corporate 
managers to act ethically in the best interest of their shareholders. In the context of M&A, the Act 
could contribute to deterring managers from engaging in acquisitions that increase their own 
wealth at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. Hence, SOX is expected to dispel shareholders’ 
fears that managers might engage in non-value maximizing acquisitions. As a result, acquirers’ 
shareholders might exhibit less negative reaction to M&A announcements after the 
implementation of SOX. This reasoning leads to the formulation of the first hypothesis:
H1 - The market performance of U.S. acquirers around the acquisition announcement day has 
improved after the passage of SOX.
Section 302 of the SOX 2002 Act (Corporate Responsibility of Financial Reporting) aims at 
boosting the quality of financial reporting by ensuring that financial statements are free from 
misleading materials and omissions (Lobo and Zhou, 2010). If SOX has been effective at achieving 
this aim, financial statements should tend to reflect more the true economic situation of firms. 
Consequently, information asymmetry and stock mispricing could be reduced because financial 
reports would better reflect the fundamental value of the firm. From this angle, and contrary to the 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting10
negative market performance witnessed by stock acquirers around the announcement day (Yook, 
2003; Oler, 2008; Alexandridis et al., 2010 and others), acquirers are expected to demonstrate a 
less negative market reaction to stock financed acquisition announcements because SOX 2002 
contributes to dispelling investors’ fears that stock financed acquisitions signal stock overpricing. 
This reasoning leads to the formulation of the second hypothesis:
H2 - The market performance of U.S. stock acquirers around the acquisition announcement day 
has improved after the passage of SOX. 
Empirical research (such as Franks et al., 1991; Antoniou et al., 2007; Alexandridis et al., 
2010) report market favorability towards cash financed acquisitions (Benefit of Debt Theory). In 
more explicit terms, the market exhibits favorable market reaction towards cash financed bids 
because investors perceive cash financing as a disciplining means for managerial conduct. If SOX 
2002 has been effective, it should enhance governance, thus assuring responsible managerial 
conduct through its imposed penalties on managerial divergent behaviors. Although investors 
would still show a favorable reaction towards cash financed acquisition, their favorable reaction 
should be lower in magnitude because SOX 2002 offers a better governing atmosphere regardless 
of the takeover’s financial considerations. As a result, it is expected that U.S. cash acquirers’ 
market performance around the acquisition announcement day will be positive but with a lower 
magnitude after the implementation of SOX. This reasoning leads to the formulation of the third 
hypothesis:
 
H3 - The market performance of U.S. cash acquirers around the acquisition announcement day has 
declined after the passage of SOX.
4. Data and Methodology
The following paragraphs describe the sampling procedures and outline the methodology used. 
Data collection and sample description 
Data on M&As announcements are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Stock prices, data on 
firms, and data on bids are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream. The sample consists of 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting11
675 complete bids (excluding reverse takeovers, stock repurchases and acquirers listed in foreign 
exchanges) that were announced during the period January, 1999 and 31 December 2006 (pre-
SOX: January, 1999- July, 25, 2002 and post-SOX: July 26, 2002-December 31, 2006) by US 
companies. Only US acquirers acquiring US targets are included in the sample (Table 1). 
Furthermore, in order for an acquiring company to be included in the final sample, the following 
criteria are fulfilled:
- The deal is successfully completed2
- The bidder and the target are publically listed US firms
- The bidder and its target are non-financial companies 
- The transaction is either pure stock swap or pure cash
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Table 1 shows a considerable decrease in the sample size from 301,014 to 675, it should 
be noted that the starting number of observations reflects the population of M&As available in 
Thomson Reuters Eikon before applying any filtering. Upon the application of various data 
filtering criteria, the sample size nets to 675.  These filtering procedures described in table 1 reflect 
the cross-sectional and time scope of the study (the acquisitions of public targets over the period 
1999-2006). The study period ends in 2006 to isolate the effect of the world financial crisis. The 
sample size is relatively comparable to that of Louis (2004) with 373 mergers over the period 
1992-2000.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the year 1999 witnessed the highest number of acquisitions 
among the sampled years, with a total of 144 bids (21.33% of the sample) whereas the year 2004 
witnessed the lowest number of acquisitions with a total of 57 bids only (8.44% of the sample). 
Panel A also shows that unlike stock bids, cash bids are distributed in similar percentages across 
2 Our analysis does not consider firms that go private after the acquisition given that this type of firms suffer from a 
different form of agency problem represented by power imbalance between large and small shareholders rather than 
the managerial induced agency problem that we investigate with respect to the SOX adoption. See Belkhir et al. (2013) 
and Boubaker et al. (2014) on the causes of going private and how such decisions can mitigate the consequences of 
the imbalance in the shareholders.





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting12
the years of the sampling period whereas Panel B of Table 2 shows that the highest percentage 
(36.3%) of the sample is for acquirers operating in the high technology industry. Real estate and 
retail industries have the least contribution to the sample with 2.37% and 3.41% respectively.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3 shows that in the pre-SOX sample, cash and stock bids have relatively close 
proportions with 49.25% and 50.75% respectively. However, in the post-SOX period, cash bids 
have markedly higher proportion than stock bids as they contribute to 73.45% of the post-SOX 
sample.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The choice of market performance proxy 
This study investigates the change in the US acquirers’ market performance around the adoption 
of SOX.  We follow the standard approach estimating cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) 
as a measure of market performance (Antoniou et al., 2007; Masulis et al., 2007; Louis, 2004). 
The rationale for using abnormal returns is its ability to capture the investors’ reactions to 
acquisition announcements represented by stock price movements uniquely attributed to the 
acquisition event. Consequently, the estimation of abnormal returns requires a benchmark of 
normal returns. Normal or expected returns can be estimated using asset pricing models such as 
the market model and Fama and French (1995) model. Consistent with Firth (1980), Wansley et 
al. (1983), Yook (2003), and Goergen and Renneboog (2004), and based on the premise that there 
is no evidence that more complicated models provide additional benefits (Dyckman et al. 1984; 
Armitage, 1995), this paper uses the market model to estimate the normal returns during the 
estimation period. However, in an attempt to ensure the robustness of the results, we additionally 
use the market adjusted returns model as an alternative model for estimating normal returns (Smith 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting13
and Kim, 1994; Walker, 2000; Fuller et al., 2002; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). The market 
model is expressed as:
                                                               
                                                                                (1)              𝑬𝑹𝒋,𝒕 = 𝜶𝒋 + 𝜷𝒋𝑹𝒎,𝒕 + 𝒆𝒋,𝒕
Where,
 is the expected return on stock j at time t𝐸𝑅𝑗,𝑡
 is the return on market index on time t𝑅𝑚,𝑡
 is the intercept.𝛼𝑗
 is the estimated measure of stock j's systematic risk.𝛽𝑗
In order to obtain the coefficients of the market model, this regression is run using daily return 
data of 260 days (i.e. from -300 to -61 days where day zero is the announcement day). Then the 
abnormal return on any stock and on each day is calculated as follows:
 
=                                                                                           (2)                            𝑨𝑹𝒋,𝒕 𝑹𝒋,𝒕 ― 𝑬(𝑹𝒋,𝒕)
Where,
 is the abnormal return on stock j at time t𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
  is the actual logarithmic return on stock j at time t𝑅𝑗,𝑡
 is the expected return on stock j at time t𝐸(𝑅𝑗,𝑡)
The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as follows:
                                                                                      (3)       𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝒋, ― 𝒌 + 𝒌) = ∑
𝒌
―𝒌𝑨𝑹𝒕
Moreover, this paper uses an event study approach where the choice of an appropriate event 
window is crucial (Mackinlay, 1997). In this line, average abnormal returns (AARs) play a pivotal 
role in identifying market reaction to the release of a firm-specific type of information 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) such as M&A announcements. In this study, test results of AAR 
values show that the most appropriate event window for hypothesis testing is (-1, 0). Additional 
event windows (-2, +2) are also included in the study for the purpose of comparing our results with 
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those of previous studies (Masulis et al., 2007 and Antoniou et al., 2007). Moreover, t-tests and 
Wilcoxon rank tests are used to test the significance of mean and median CAR values respectively 
for the aggregate sample and the stock, cash, pre- and post-SOX subsamples. 
Multivariate Regression
There is considerable empirical evidence on the favorable role for corporate governance practices 
in mitigating shareholders’ concerns on agency driven managerial conduct. For example, Masulis 
et al. (2007) study one form of corporate governance, namely antitakeover provisions, and find 
that firms that are protected by this form of governance witness lower returns around the 
announcement acquisition date which is an indication that these firms are less subject to corporate 
governance forces.  Moreover, the authors find that firms that separate the CEO from chairman 
position witness higher abnormal returns around the announcement. Koerniadi et al. (2014) 
construct a corporate governance index using a number of corporate governance variables namely, 
board compensation, shareholders right, and disclosure policies. The authors find that corporate 
governance is associated with a lower level of risks measured by volatility.  Gompers et al. (2003) 
study the effect of seven corporate governance factors, related to board’s characteristics, 
attendance, the share ownership of its members and shareholders’ rights, on the pricing of the 
firms’ options. Thus, to insure that the improved market performance around SOX adoption is not 
driven by governance characteristics of firms, we control for the following corporate governance 
measures:
- Board size: Lipton and Lorsche (1992) and Jensen (1994) were pioneers in highlighting the 
importance of having an optimal board size for a smooth functioning of the firm. Similar studies 
find evidence that the size of the board provides signals for investors on the effectiveness of board 
conduct. For instance, while small size boards may not be capable of effectively managing the 
firm, large boards may suffer from confirmation bias as some board members may choose to 
suppress their honesty and “mold the corporate disclosure policy to keep their private benefits 
extraction activities secret from outsiders” (Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008, p. 963). Beiner et al. 
(2004) explain that large board sizes could be associated with agency problem as the board ends 
up being “prestige” with no actual monitoring for its duties. Conversely, some other empirical 





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting15
studies have found evidence for an inverse relationship between board size and firms’ valuation 
(Yermack, 1996). 
- Board independence and non-executive board members: the rationale for using board 
independence as a corporate governance indicator springs from the potential monitoring that these 
members exercise on boards’ decisions (Fama, 1980). This is empirically manifested by a 
significant positive relationship between board independence and firm’s performance (Dahya et 
al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2009 and Bruno and Claessens, 2010).
- CEO Duality takes place when the CEO of the firm acts as the chair of the board. There are two 
theoretical predictions for the effect of CEO duality on firm’s performance. From the perspective 
of Agency theory, CEO duality enforces the CEO’s control over the board. This weakens the 
independence of the board which is crucial for monitoring the managerial conduct. From the 
perspective of Stewardship theory, CEO duality enhances the focus of management (Salancik and   
Pfeffer, 1980; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994: Dahya et al., 1996). 
The inconclusive theoretical predictions on the role of CEO independence is also reflected by 
mixed evidence highlighted by other empirical studies (Daily and Dalton, 1994 and Faleye, 2007).
- Number of board meetings: the frequency of board meetings can be an indicator of increased 
monitoring by the firms’ top management. However, empirical evidence suggests that more 
frequent meetings are succeeded by poor performance of firms and higher occurrences of fraud 
(Vafeas, 1999; Chen et al., 2006). Chen et al. (2006) explain that this result could be due to the 
possibility that board members are discussing illegal activities when they are meeting.
In addition to the governance factors discussed above, we also include firm and bid-related 
variables that have proven to affect bidders’ market performance around the acquisition 
announcements. The following paragraphs introduce these variables and explains the rationale for 
including them in the empirical model.
- Size:  Moeller et al. (2004) report that the returns for small acquirers (significant gains of 2.318%) 
are approximately two percentage points higher than large acquirers (insignificant gains of 
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0.076%) regardless of the adopted method of payment. To explain their findings, the authors 
investigate the possibility that size effect is driven by other bid characteristics such as the mode of 
payment, and whether the target is a private or public firm. They find that neither of these 
characteristics can explain the size effect and attribute this effect to managerial hubris driving 
managers to acquire large firms. Similar findings are also provided by Moeller et al. (2004) and 
Gorton et al. (2009).
 
- Relative Size: Asquith et al. (1983) argue that if acquirers’ value is affected by mergers then it 
should be affected by the relative size of targets to the acquirers. They find that the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) increase as relative target size increases and firm size decreases. 
Moreover, Mueller and Sirower (2003) report that the losses to the acquiring firm's shareholders 
are proportionally larger when the target's size relative to the size of the bidder is smaller.
- Market to Book Value: The relative market to book value of the bidder can be an indicator of 
hubris driven acquisitions. For instance, managers and investors would overestimate the ability of 
glamour acquirers at managing the acquiring company. Consistently, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that companies with high P/E or MTBV ratios (i.e. 
glamour firms) underperform those with low P/E or MTBV ratios (i.e. value firms).
We control for these variables in investigating the change in US acquirers’ market performance 
around the adoption of SOX by estimating the following model: 
= + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + +                                                           (4)𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
where CARi,t is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) over the two event windows (t = [-1,0] 
and t = [-2,+2]) using the market model; SOX is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in 
the post-SOX and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board members; 
NONEXCi,t represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDEP,t is the proportion 
of non-executive officers being independent; CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking on the value 
of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise; and  BRD_MTG is the number of 
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board meetings during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its 
total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the ratio 
of the value of the transaction to the market value of the acquirer the year prior to the 
announcement date; MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio defined as the market 
value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the 
year before the merger announcement; a0 is an intercept term; and εi,t is the residual term. We 
estimate model 4 using ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity.3 The effect of SOX is captured by  In line with H1, If SOX has been effective 𝑎1.
in mitigating investors’ agency concerns, we expect  to be positive and significant. We also 𝑎1
segregate our aggregate sample into stock and cash subsamples and follow two approaches: in the 
first we augment model 4 with dummies related to the mode of payment as follows:
= + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑎11𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑎13 
                                                                                                                                  (5)𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where Stock is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for stock financed acquisitions and 
0 otherwise. Cash is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for cash financed acquisitions and 
0 otherwise. In line with prior evidence on negative market performance for stock acquirers and a 
positive market performance for cash acquirers, we expect   to be negative and significant and 𝑎10
we expect  to be positive and significant. The change in the market performance of stock and 𝑎13
cash acquirers is reflected by  and . In line with H2 and H3, we expect  to be positive 𝑎11 𝑎13 𝑎11
and to be negative and significant respectively. It is worth mentioning here that given that our 𝑎13
sample consists of stock and cash acquisitions only, we need to omit cash related variables from 
model (5) when estimating the effect of SOX on stock acquirers and we need to omit stock related 
variables when estimating the effect of SOX on cash acquirers. 
In the second approach, we re-estimate model 4 for each of the subsamples. In line with H2, 
we expect that the negative market performance to decrease in the post-S0X period:  is positive 𝑎1
3 The Variance Inflation Factor for the regression is 1.54 indicating that there is no multicollinearity issue.





























































Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting18
and significant. Also, in line with H3, we expect the favorable market reaction for cash acquirers 
to decrease:  is negative and significant. 𝑎1
5. Empirical results 
Univariate analysis results 
U.S. acquirers’ market performance
Panel A of Table 4 shows that US acquirers suffer from statistically significant loss around the 
announcement day of the merger. For instance, on the announcement day and the day before it, 
US acquirers earn a mean (median) cumulative abnormal return of -0.92% (-0.35%), both values 
are significant at 1%. This finding is consistent with results of a number of studies that report 
negative market performance for US acquirers around the announcement of the acquisition (see 
for example Smith and Kim, 1994; Walker 2000; Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 2007). This 
negative market performance highlights investors’ concerns about the managerial intentions 
behind engaging in such activities.
Table 4 Panel A also shows that stock acquirers suffer from a statistically significant loss over 
three event windows. For instance, results for the event window of (-1, 0) show that stock acquirers 
witness mean and median CAR values of -2.49% and -1.52% respectively, both are significant at 
1%.  Over the three-day event window, acquirers even suffer a greater loss with mean and median 
CAR of -3.34% and -3.1% respectively (significant at 1%). These results are consistent with those 
of Yook (2003) and Louis (2004) and could be explained by the Signaling theory which suggests 
that in an imperfectly efficient market, if a company chooses to finance an acquisition through 
stocks, it signals to the market that its stocks are overvalued. As a result, the market would react 
negatively to stock-financed acquisition announcement (Yook, 2003).
Moreover, Panel A of Table 4 shows that cash acquirers witness favorable market performance 
around the announcement of the bid. This is demonstrated by mean and median CAR (-1, +1) 
values of 0.63% and 0.13% respectively (significant at 5%).  However, it is worth mentioning that 
over the event window (-1, 0) which is the basic event window of this study, cash acquirers witness 
insignificant mean and median cumulative abnormal return of 0.11% and 0.02% respectively. In 
fact, the results of cash acquisitions are consistent with the findings of other studies that have also 
found a positive market performance for cash acquirers around the announcement day (see for 
example, Louis (2004) who reported a significant mean CAR (-1, +1) value of 0.440%). This can 
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be explained by The Benefit of Debt theory that suggests that, in cash financed acquisitions, the 
company has either to issue debt or to use the hoarded liquidity to finance the acquisition. When a 
company issues debt, borrowing would pressure managers to act more efficiently thus reducing 
agency costs (Yook, 2003) and the cost of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow spent at the 
discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986). Panel A also demonstrates that the return difference 
between the market performance of stock acquirers and that of cash acquirers is statistically 
significant. When the market adjusted model is used, results are roughly the same for the aggregate 
sample (stock and cash bids).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
The change in U.S. acquirers’ market performance
When pre- and post- SOX subsamples are analyzed, the negative market performance remains 
evident in the pre-SOX subsample. For instance, Panel B of Table 4 shows that over the 
announcement day and the day before it, acquirers in the pre-SOX sample earn a mean and a 
median cumulative abnormal return values of -1.33% and -0.65% respectively, both are significant 
at 1%. Moreover, over the three-day event window, the mean and median CAR results show 
significant values of -1.11% and -0.72% respectively. In the post-SOX period, results reveal that 
the negative market performance is still obvious, however with a lower significance level. For 
example, the mean and median CAR (-1, 0) values are -0.33% (insignificant) and -0.15% 
(significant at 10%) respectively. Over the three-day event window, the mean and median CAR 
values score are -0.73% and -0.37% respectively, with a 10% significance level. Moreover, the 
pre-post- SOX return difference (Post-Pre) is positive over all event windows. For instance, the 
mean return difference for the pre-post over (-1, 0) event window is 0.99% with a significance 
level of 5%. Thus, it can be inferred that the cumulative abnormal return values for US acquirers 
have improved in the post-SOX period. More precisely, the market participants show a less 
negative market reaction to acquisition announcement.
This empirical evidence is considered as a support for the first hypothesis. In other words, the 
US acquirers’ market performance has improved after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. 
This performance improvement can be explained by the favorable governance atmosphere 
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introduced by the Act. Better governance leads to better acquisition decisions (Porta et al., 2002; 
Masulis et al., 2007), higher returns and lower agency costs (Gompers et al., 2003). It also makes 
investors more informed and less susceptible to corporate events and news. 
On a more specific level, Table 5 reports the results for Pre- and Post-SOX analysis, for stock 
and cash acquirers’ subsamples. Results show that over the three reported event windows stock 
acquirers earn significant negative cumulative abnormal returns in the pre-SOX period. For 
instance, over the announcement day and the day before it, stock acquirers earn mean (median) 
CAR values of -2.82% and -1.66% respectively, both significant at 1%. Moreover, the mean 
(median) CAR (-1, +1) value is -3.16% (-3.13%), both significant at the 1% level. In the post-SOX 
period stock acquirers do not show consistent values of CAR over the three reported event 
windows. In other words, the mean CAR (-1, 0) value has increased to -1.59% (significant at 10%). 
Moreover, the median CAR (-1, 0) is -1% (insignificant). However, over the three-day event 
window the mean cumulative abnormal return CAR (-1, +1) has decreased to -3.84%, (significant 
at 1%) level, whereas the median CAR (-1, +1) has increased to -2.98% (significant at 5%).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5 also shows that, over the basic event window (-1, 0), stock acquirers witness an 
improved market reaction to acquisition announcements in the post-SOX period. The mean return 
difference (post-pre) is 1.12%. However, this value is insignificant. Therefore, there is no sound 
evidence about the improvement of stock acquirers’ market performance after the implementation 
of the SOX Act. This leads to a partial support for the second hypothesis. Post-SOX period, stock 
acquirers exhibit less negative reaction to M&As possibly due to an increased confidence in the 
quality of financial reporting and a reduced information asymmetry between the underwriter and 
the investor (Kasrer et al., 2011). For cash bids, Table 5 shows that in the pre-SOX period, cash 
acquirers earn positive abnormal returns around the announcement day. The mean CAR (-1, 0) 
scores a positive value of 0.11% (a median value of 0.07%). Furthermore, the mean and median 
CAR (-2, +2) values are 1.10% and 0.15% respectively. Results in the post-SOX period show that 
the only significant cumulative abnormal returns for cash acquirers are reported for the event 
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window (-2, +2) days as the corresponding mean and median values are 0.58% and 0.28%. The 
pre-post-SOX return difference for cash acquirers reveals insignificant mean (median) values of 
0.00% (-0.08%) over the event window (-1, 0) day. Thus, it can be inferred that cash acquirers 
have not witnessed any change in the market performance in the post- SOX period. In other words, 
there is no empirical support for the third hypothesis that suggests that there is decline in the market 
performance of cash acquirers around the announcement day in the post-SOX period.
Multivariate analysis results 
The following section explains the results of the multivariate analysis where we investigate the 
change in US acquirers’ market performance after the adoption of SOX and control for bid and 
firm related variables that can affect the acquirers’ market performance.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of these firm and bid related variables for the entire 
sample, as well as for stock and cash bids in the pre- and post- SOX periods. It is worth mentioning 
that the small sample size in the pre-SOX period is due to the possibility that firms were not serious 
in reporting corporate governance variables before SOX. This is highlighted by the increase in the 
sample size for these variables in the post-SOX period. In the pre-SOX periods, all corporate 
governance and firm related variables seem to have similar values across entire sample and cash 
and stock subcategories. It is noteworthy, however, on average, that in the post-SOX period, the 
relative size of the target in stock acquisitions is almost double the relative size of the cash 
acquirers, which is consistent with the suggestions of Moeller et al., (2004) that cash is usually 
used to finance the acquisition of small targets.
Multivariate regressions with a SOX dummy variable 
This section reports the results for regressing US acquirers market performance on a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one in the post-SOX period and zero otherwise while controlling 
for corporate governance and other firm related variables. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in Table 7, US acquirers’ market performance has improved in the post-SOX period. 
This is represented by the positive and significant coefficient of SOX dummy. It means that the 
market reaction is less negative after adopting SOX. In columns (1) and (2) we report the results, 
for CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-2, +2)4 respectively, thus estimating equation (4) without firm and bid 
related variables, namely size, relative size and MTBV. In column (3) and (4) we report the results 
for all variables. Results are robust to using different event windows as all columns, pertaining to 
the two day and three-day event windows, show positive and significant coefficients  indicating 𝑎1
an improvement in the market performance of US acquirers following the adoption of SOX.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the improvement in market performance is not driven by 
changes in governance and firm and bid related variables. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 8 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We extend the analysis to study the change in market performance for stock and cash acquirers 
separately. For this aim, we augment model 4 with payment related dummies as follows: 
= + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑎11𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑎13 
                                                                                                                                    (5)𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where Cash is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for cash financed acquisitions and 0 
otherwise and Stock is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for stock financed acquisitions 
and 0 otherwise. This complementary analysis allows for revealing possible channels through 
4 The choice of event widow (-1, 0) is based on empirical testing following McWilliams and Siegel (1997). We also 
add the event window (-2,+2) due to its frequent use in similar studies.
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which the improvement in the market performance of US acquirers has taken place. In other words, 
earlier studies have reported a difference in the performance between stock and cash acquirers. It 
has been documented that negative market performance suffered by stock acquirers around the 
announcement of acquisition can be explained by the Signaling theory (Yook, 2003). Therefore, 
if the improvement in market performance that is reported for the aggregate sample of acquirers 
holds for stock acquirers, then this can be an indication that SOX has improved US acquirers’ 
market performance by improving the quality of information environment as investors have more 
confidence that the prices of stocks reflect the true economic value of firms, and will not react to 
stock acquisition announcement as a signal of mispricing. To test for the effect of SOX on the 
market performance of stock acquirers, we omit cash related variables from model 5. In line with 
prior findings on negative market performance for US acquirers we expect  to be negative and 𝑎10
significant. Also, in line with our second hypothesis we expect a less negative market performance 
for US acquirers represented by a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term 
Stock_SOX . To test for the effect of SOX on the performance of cash acquirers, we omit the 𝑎11
stock related variables from model 5. Also, consistent with prior literature on the significant 
positive market reaction to cash financed acquisitions we expect  to be positive and significant. 𝑎12
Moreover, we expect a decrease in this positive market performance following the improved 
governance brought by SOX. In other words, we expect to be negative,𝑎13
Table 8 shows the results for estimating model 5. The first and second column report the results 
for the event window (-1, 0) for cash and stock acquirers, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report 
the same estimation respectively for the (-2, +2) event window for cash and stock acquirers 
respectively.  Results show that coefficient of Cash dummy ( ) is positive and significant, while 𝑎12
the coefficient of stock acquirers  is negative and significant. These findings confirm the results 𝑎10
of univariate section and are consistent with previous studies reporting return difference between 
stock and cash acquisitions where the negative market reaction to stock financed acquisition 
reflects shareholders’ fears of acquirers’ stock overvaluation. On the other hand, the favorable 
market performance of cash acquisitions reflects the governance role of this form of financing. In 
Table 8, we also look at the change in US stock and cash acquirers’ market performance from a 
Signaling theory and Benefit of Debt theory perspectives; the interactions term Stock_SOX and 
Cash_SOX indicate whether the change in market performance is different for cash and stock 
subsamples. Table 8 shows that the coefficients of these interaction  and  of SOX with stock 𝑎11 𝑎13
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and cash respectively, are insignificant. This indicates no evidence that stock or cash acquirers 
witness a unique change in their market performance after the adoption of SOX, thus there is no 
support for H2 and H3.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 9 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To further investigate the change in the market performance for cash and stock acquirers, we 
re-estimate model 4 on cash and stock samples separately. Table 9 shows the results of estimating 
model 4 for these two subsamples. It shows that the coefficients on SOX dummy (𝑎10 from model 4
are insignificant for the two event windows across the two subgroups.  Consequently, with ) 
respect to stock acquirers, there are indications that SOX was not effective at reducing stock 
markets’ concerns of mispricing that is usually signaled by stock acquisitions (H2 not supported). 
The insignificant changes in the market performance of stock acquirers can be interpreted in light 
of the findings of Rice et al. (2015) regarding the unreliability of SOX reports and its creation of 
additional confusion for investors. For Cash acquisitions, the insignificant change can be an 
indicator that cash acquisitions continue to play the positive governance role in the post-SOX 
period.
In a nutshell, on the aggregate level5, our results show a significant improvement in the market 
performance after the adoption of SOX. These results are consistent with previous studies 
highlighting an improvement in investor confidence in the quality of corporate and information 
quality (Aghimien, 2010; Abdioglu et al., 2015). In particular, the results are also in line with the 
findings of Bhabra and Hossain (2017) that the US acquirers’ market performance has improved 
after SOX. However, we do not find any significant effect for the stock and cash subsamples. Our 
results also highlight the possibility of the existence of channels through which SOX lead to the 
improvement in US acquirers market performance, other than the Signaling theory channel. 
5 Results are robust to using log of Relative Size
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6. Robustness tests 
Our baseline estimations highlight evidence of a less negative reaction to mergers and acquisitions 
announcements after the adoption of SOX 2002 which reflects higher confidence in managerial 
decision making. In this section we investigate whether our results are driven by an omitted bias, 
a major source for endogeneity in social sciences.  In our baseline empirical model, model 4, we 
include firm as well as bid related variables as control variables for estimating the effect of SOX 
adoption on US acquirers’ market performance. It can be argued that additional unobserved 
variables could have affected the market performance around that SOX adoption time. For 
instance, an overall trend in improvement in acquirer’s market performance, proxied by 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), might be driving the reported improvements in market 
performance following the adoption of SOX. To control for this possibility, we use time and 
industry fixed effects (FE). Specifically, we augment model (4) with yearly and industry fixed 
effects allowing CAR to vary across years and industries.
Results of table 10 show that using FE estimation does not affect the significance of the 
improved market performance.  For instance, the change in market performance , proxied by the 𝑎1
5-day CAR (-2, +2) still takes on a significant positive value of 0.0739, significant at 5%, when 
all governance and size variables are considered- an additional support for H1.
  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 10 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When we consider the stock and cash subsamples separately in tables 11 and 12, results show 
that there is no change in US stock and cash acquirers’ market performance after the adoption of 
SOX (the coefficients  and  from model 5 representing the change in stock and cash 𝑎11 𝑎13
acquisitions respectively from table 11 are not significant). Similar to baseline analysis, we 
conduct out robustness checks of the change in market performance by estimating model (4) for 
stock and cash subsamples separately (table 12). Table 12 shows no change in the market 
performance of stock and cash acquisitions, where this insignificant change is represented by 
insignificant  from model 4 after controlling for unobserved year and industry variations.𝑎1
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The second probable source of endogeneity is measurement error. This form of endogeneity 
takes place when the utilized independent variables do not reflect the studied construct. For 
instance, the number of board meetings does not accurately measure the level of governance in a 
firm. It should be noted here that the firm and bid characteristics adopted in this study are backed 
by the variables’ wide adoption by a battery of reputable studies (Vafeas, 1999; Chen et al., 2006; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Asquith et al.,1983; Mueller and Sirower, 2003). 
The third source of endogeneity is simultaneity. In the context of this study, simultaneity can 
take place through two channels. The first path happens when the abnormal market performance 
of US acquirers around acquisition announcements affects the independent variables. Such a 
scenario is very unlikely and insensible given that these independent variables are estimated before 
the happenstance of the acquisitions. In other words, there is a delay between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. The second path happens when the US acquires’ market 
performance causes the adoption of SOX. In other words, it can be argued that regulators have 
timed the adoption of SOX with the improved market performance. This is also an insensible 
scenario because our sampled acquisitions are spread over several years in the pre and the post-
SOX periods and not on the particular SOX adoption day.  It can also be argued that the adoption 
of SOX happened in response to the improved governance. Future research can address further 
endogeneity concerns by using propensity score matching and instrumental variables.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 11 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 12 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Conclusion
Mergers and acquisitions are significant corporate actions that drive changes in shareholder wealth. 
Our paper attempts to provide a laboratory for studying the magnitude of such changes in light of 
a significant regulatory transformation like SOX. Bhabra and Hossain (2017) investigate the effect 
of the adoption of SOX on US acquirers’ market performance and note that the serious penalties 
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that this Act imposes on managerial misconduct reduce managerial fraud. Thus, acquirers’ 
shareholders show improved attitude towards acquisition decisions. While the authors find 
evidence supporting this conjecture, their evidence is only limited to an aggregate sample of US 
acquirers. We therefore extend their work by investigating the effect of SOX on US acquirers’ 
market performance by considering stock and cash acquisitions separately. We believe that this 
approach provides unique insights on the role of this Act in reducing the consequences of 
information asymmetry that is usually manifested by a negative market reaction to cash 
acquisitions as suggested by the Signaling theory.  At the aggregate level, our results show 
significant improvements in the market performance in post- SOX that could be explained by the 
favorable governance atmosphere that reigned after the enactment of the Act, thus signaling 
improved investors’ confidence in corporate decisions. This is consistent with the findings of 
Bhabra and Hossain (2017). Nevertheless, when accounting for the mode of payment, results show 
that stock acquirers witness an insignificant improvement in the market performance although 
there are indications that the SOX-induced transparency may have lessened the negative reaction 
to the information content inherent in the stock-financed acquisition announcements. Cash 
acquirers do not witness any significant change in market performance after the passage of SOX, 
which can be an indicator that cash acquisitions still play the same governing role in financial 
markets.  Results stay robust after controlling for corporate governance variables as well as 
unobserved year and industry variations. 
The findings of this research have a number of important implications. For instance, the 
significant improvement in the market performance may signal more confidence in managerial 
decisions and a reduction in agency problems, thus providing evidence for regulators and 
legislators on the contribution of SOX 2002 in curbing managerial misconduct. Moreover, the 
insignificant improvement in stock acquirers’ market performance might be an indication that 
SOX is more effective in mitigating agency concerns rather than reducing mispricing concerns. 
Moreover, this study opens a window for future studies on the possible channels through which 
SOX has improved US acquirers’ market performance. Through the inclusion of additional control 
variables and the use of larger samples, future studies can consolidate the findings presented 
herein. Other directions include investigating the change in insider trading activity around the 
merger and acquisition activity after the implementation of the Act. 
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Table 1: Sampling Procedures 
Distribution Net Count
Initial Sample 301,014
Net after exclusion of:
Non-US acquirers acquiring non-US targets (43,972) 257,042
Public US acquirers acquiring non-public US targets (218,460) 38,582
Non public US acquirers (8,752) 29,830
Announcements that do not lie between 1/1/1999 and 31/12/2006 (20,380) 9,450
Acquirers whose target is from the financial sector i (2,902) 6,548
Deals whose payment method is neither pure cash nor pure equity (5,260) 1,288
Incomplete bids ii (206) 1,082
Stock repurchases iii, reverse takeovers iv, listed in foreign exchanges (69) 1,013
Missed Datastream codes (141) 872
Unavailable return indices in Datastream (166) 706
Stocks with no return index movements during estimation and event period (31) 675
Final Sample 675
i Financial sector acquisitions undergo procedures that are different than that of other acquisitions.
ii Incomplete bids include rumors, ceased rumors and withdrawn bids.
iii Deals in which both acquirer and target are the same.
iv According to Thomson Financial (TF) deal definitions, Reverse Takeover indicates a merger in which the 
acquiring company offers more than 50% of its equity as consideration offered to the target company resulting in 
the target company becoming the majority owner of the new company. These deals are excluded because they 
could confound the results.
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Table 2: The Distribution of the Sample across Years and Industries
Panel A: Distribution of sample acquirers by year and method of payment 
Year Stock Bids Cash Bids All Bids
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
  1999 71 26.29 73 18.02 144 21.33
  2000 62 22.96 58 14.32 120 17.78
  2001 49 18.15 50 12.35 99 14.67
  2002 22 8.15 45 11.11 67 9.93
  2003 26 9.63 41 10.12 67 9.93
  2004 15 5.56 42 10.37 57 8.44
  2005 17 6.30 42 10.37 59 8.74
  2006 8 2.96 54 13.33 62 9.19
Total 270 100.00 405 100.00 675 100.00




Consumer Products 35 5.19
Consumer Staples 26 3.85
Energy and Power 44 6.52
Healthcare 108 16.00
High Technology 245 36.30
Industrials 71 10.52
Materials 25 3.70
Media and Entertainment 31 4.59




This table   shows the distributions of   bids across years, and across industries. Panel A shows the distributions 
for all, stock, and cash bids across years of the study 1999-2006. Panel B shows the distribution of all bids 
across industries
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Table 3: Cross-tabulation between Method of Payment and Period (before & after SOX 
2002)
 Pre-SOX bids Post-SOX bids All Bids
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Stock Bids 197 49.25 73 26.54 270 40.00
Cash Bids 203 50.75 202 73.45 405 60.00
Total 400 100.00 275 100.00 675 100.00
This table cross-tabulates the number and percentage of the acquisitions and the per-versus post-SOX periods.
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Using the Market Model
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) results for entire sample, stock and cash bids
Difference
All Bids            Stock Bids         Cash Bids Stock – Cash
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
CAR (-1,0) -0.0092*** -0.0035***
                            
-0.0249*** -0.0152*** 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0260*** -0.0154***
P-Value (0.0005) (0.0000)      (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3317) (0.3410) (0.0000)   (0.0000)
No. of Obs. 675 270 405
CAR (-1,+1) -0.0095*** -0.0048***
                               
-0.0334*** -0.0310***     0.0063** 0.0013** -0.0398*** -0.0324***
P-Value (0.0061) (0.0005)       (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0256) (0.0220) (0.0000)    (0.0000)
No. of Obs. 675 270 405
CAR (-2,+2) -0.0073** -0.0054***
                           
-0.0311*** -0.0302***     0.0084*** 0.0023** -0.0396*** -0.0326***
P-Value (0.0434)  (0.0040)      (0.0004) (0.0000)    (0.0089) (0.0235) (0.0000) (0.0000)
No. of Obs. 675 270 405
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) results for the pre--and post-SOX subsamples
  Difference
Pre-SOX Bids Post-SOX Bids Post SOX-Pre SOX
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean median 
CAR (-1,0)  -0.0133*** -0.0065*** -0.0033 -0.0015* 0.0099** 0.0049**
P-Value  (0.0005)   (0.0000) (0.1653) (0.0750) (0.0410) (0.0435)
No. of Obs. 400     275
  
CAR (-1,+1) -0.0111**  -0.0072*** -0.0073* -0.0037*     0.0037 0.0035
P-Value (0.0250)    (0.0015) (0.0516) (0.0760) (0.3135) (0.1425)
No. of Obs. 400     275
  
CAR (-2,+2)   -0.0090* -0.0106*** -0.0049 -0.0011 0.0041 0.0095*
P-Value (0.0798)    (0.0035) (0.1577) (0.2635) (0.3169) (0.0450)
No. of Obs. 400     275
 
This table shows the results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for acquiring firms using the Market model over three event 
windows. The first event window is estimated over the day of the bid announcement and the day before it (t = [-1, 0]); the second event 
is estimated over the period from one day before to one day after the bid announcement day (t = [-1, +1]); and the third event window 
is estimated over the period from two days before to two days after the bid announcement day(t=[-2,+2]).Panel A shows CARs results 
for entire sample, stock and cash bids while Panel B reveals CARs values for the Pre--and Post-SOX subsamples. The results are based 
on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for the medians). P-values are given in parentheses 
and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, *denote one-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) using the Market Model for the Pre- and Post-SOX Bids with the Method of 
Payment
Stock Bids Cash Bids
Difference  Difference
Pre-SOX Bids Post-SOX Bids Post-Pre Pre-SOX Bids Post-SOX Bids Post-Pre
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
CAR (-1,0) -0.0282*** -0.0166*** -0.0159*  -0.0100 0.0122 0.0066 0.0011 0.0007*** 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0008
P-Value  (0.0000)   (0.0000)      (0.0570)   (0.3385)
     
(0.1702) (0.1920)     (0.3963) (0.0080) (0.3513) (0.4725) (0.4979) (0.4175)
No. of Obs. 197 73 203 202
CAR (-1,+1) -0.0316*** -0.0313***    -0.0384***  -0.0298** -0.0068 0.0015
           
0.0087** 0.0016*** 0.0039 0.0009 -0.0048 -0.0007
P-Value
 
 (0.0009)   (0.0000)      (0.0007)    (0.0455) (0.3519) (0.3770)   (0.0403) (0.0000) (0.1734) (0.1215) (0.2273) (0.2930)
No. of Obs. 197 73                203 202
CAR (-2,+2) -0.0298*** -0.0308***    -0.0347*** -0.0293* -0.0048 0.0015
   
0.0110**
           
0.0015*** 0.0058* 0.0028* -0.0051 0.0013
P-Value   (0.0055)   (0.0000)      (0.0047)    (0.0695)
                
(0.4074) (0.3035) (0.0232) (0.0020) (0.0967) (0.0750) (0.2330) (0.4755)
No. of Obs. 197 73 203 202
This table shows the results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for acquiring firms over three event windows for pre- and post-SOX bids under both stock and 
cash sub-samples. The first event window is estimated over the day of the bid announcement, and the day before it (t = [-1, 0]); the second event window is estimated 
over the period from one day before to one day after the bid announcement day (t = [-1, +1]) and the third event window is estimated over the period from two days 
before to two days after the bid announcement day (t=[-2,+2]). The results are based on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test for the medians). P-values are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, *denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of Pre-SOX bids        
All Bids Stock Bids Cash Bids
N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD
BRD_SIZE 77 10.86 11.00 2.17 38 10.53 11.00 2.04 39 11.18 12.00 2.27
NONEXC 72 85.36 88.89 7.96 37 7.88 88.89 7.88 35 87.96 91.67 7.29
INDEP 76 76.37 80.19 17.61 38 13.37 80.19 13.37 38 76.19 83.22 21.19
CEO_DUAL 81 0.88 1.00 0.33 39 0.87 1.00 0.34 42 0.88 1.00 0.33
BRD_MGT 63 8.17 7.00 3.08 32 8.25 7.00 3.44 31 8.10 7.00 2.71
SIZE 81 16.65 16.79 1.39 39 7.17 7.24 0.61 42 16.69 16.83 1.37
R_SIZE 80 508.33 293.52 945.21 39 476.75 293.52 476.75 41 578.18 329.11 1240.29
MTBV 81 3.81 3.42 1.87 39 3.78 3.42 1.84 42 42.00 3.24 1.92
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of Post-SOX bids        
All Bids Stock Bids Cash Bids
N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD
BRD_SIZE 129 10.63 11.00 2.08 25 10.64 11.00 2.10 104 10.63 11.00 2.09
NONEXC 125 84.23 87.50 8.47 24 83.38 85.16 7.60 101 84.44 87.5 8.69
INDEP 126 76.55 78.33 13.03 24 75.76 76.92 12.98 102 78.94 81.82 13.03
CEO_DUAL 129 0.87 1.00 0.33 25 0.88 1.00 0.33 104 0.87 1.00 0.33
BRD_MGT 117 8.52 8.00 3.18 22 8.64 8.00 3.11 95 8.49 8.00 3.21
SIZE 129 16.49 16.47 1.32 25 16.47 16.29 1.34 104 16.50 16.55 1.32
R_SIZE 128 639.10 293.52 1352.83 25 1014.19 485.16 1578.64 103 548.05 246.67 1284.32
MTBV 128 3.94 3.42 3.19 25 3.65 3.15 2.12 103 4.00 3.42 3.40
This table shows the descriptive statistics for firm related variables by the payment method and the period. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for firm related variables 
in the pre-SOX period for all, stock, and cash bids. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all, stock and cash bids in the post-SOX period. ; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of 
total number of board members, NONEXCi,t represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being 
independent, CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings 
during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the 
ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio 
defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger announcement.
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression Results (Model 4)
Without firm and bid-related variables With firm and bid-related variables
VARIABLES CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2) CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2)
Intercept𝑎0 -0.1030 (0.1820) -0.1320 (0.2170) -0.0990 (0.285) -0.2290* (0.060)
SOX𝑎1 0.0162* (0.0570) 0.0270* (0.0630) 0.0160* (0.060) 0.0300** (0.0390)
BRD_SIZE𝑎2 0.0320 (0.2620) 0.0470 (0.2750) 0.0380 (0.194) 0.0170 (0.7210)
NONEXC𝑎3 0.0000 (0.9530)1 0.0010 (0.5400) 0.0000 (0.938)2 0.0010 (0.3590)
INDEP𝑎4 0.0002 (0.6890) -0.0005 (0.5950) 0.0002 (0.732) -0.0007 (0.4440)
CEO_DUAL  𝑎5 -0.0150 (0.2480) -0.0190 (0.2880) -0.0150 (0.290) -0.0280 (0.1400)
BRD_MTG  𝑎6 -0.0003 (0.8170) -0.0010 (0.4370) -0.0003 (0.850) -0.0020 (0.3130)
SIZE𝑎7 -0.0010 (0.837) 0.0100* (0.0540)
R_SIZE𝑎8 -0.0000 (0.951)3 -0.0000* (0.0620)4
MTBV𝑎9 -0.0005 (0.513) -0.0010 (0.5860)
Observations 175 175 175 175
R-squared (%) 3.8 3.8 3.9 6.0
This table shows estimation results for model (4): = + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + + , where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement 𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
date, SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board members, 
NONEXCi,t represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being independent, CEO_DUALi,t  
is CEO duality taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings during the year; 
SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the 
ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value 
(MTBV) ratio defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger 
announcement; a0 is an intercept term; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * 
denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
1, 2, 3, 4 The actual values of the coefficients are 0.0000431, 0.0000592, -0.000000132, and -0.00000547 respectively, all reported as 0.0000 to meet formatting 
requirements. The negative sign is kept next to the coefficients where appropriate to indicate the direction of the effect. 
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Table 8: Multivariate Regression Results with Stock and Cash Interaction Terms (Model 5)
 VARIABLES CAR (-1,0): CASH CAR (-1,0): STOCK CAR (-2,+2): CASH CAR (-2,+2): STOCK
Intercept 𝑎0 -0.0800 (0.3950) -0.0510 (0.5900) -0.2020* (0.099) -0.1560 (0.2150)
SOX𝑎1 0.0160 (0.4120) 0.0030 (0.4120) 0.0410 (0.1620) 0.0070 (0.1620)
BRD_SIZE𝑎2 0.0352 (0.2060) 0.0350 (0.2060) 0.0110 (0.7970) 0.0110 (0.7970)
NONEXC𝑎3 -0.0000 (0.9290)1 -0.0000 (0.9290)2 0.0010 (0.4490) 0.0010 (0.4490)
INDEP𝑎4 0.0001 (0.8080) 0.0001 (0.8080) -0.0010 (0.3740) -0.0010 (0.3740)
CEO_DUAL𝑎5 -0.0140 (0.3460) -0.0140 (0.3460) -0.0260 (0.1670) -0.0260 (0.1670)
BRD_MTG𝑎6 -0.0002 (0.8980) -0.0002 (0.8980) -0.0020 (0.3540) -0.0020 (0.3540)
SIZE𝑎7 -0.0020 (0.7260) -0.0020 (0.7260) 0.0090* (0.070) 0.0090* (0.0700)
R_SIZE𝑎8 0.0000 (0.9890)3 0.0000 (0.9890)4 -0.0000* (0.0510)5 -0.0000* (0.0510)6
MTBV𝑎9 0.0006 (0.4280) 0.0006 (0.4280) -0.0010 (0.5360) -0.0010 (0.5360)
CASH𝑎12 0.0280** (0.0350) 0.0460* (0.071)
CASH_SOX𝑎13 -0.0130 (0.5350) -0.0330 (0.3260)
STOCK𝑎10 -0.0280** (0.0350) -0.0460* (0.0710)
STOCK_SOX𝑎11 0.0130 (0.5350) 0.0330 (0.3260)
Observations 175 175 175 175
R-squared (%) 7.2 7.2 8.9 8.9
This table shows estimation results for model (5): = + + +  + + + + +  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9
, where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement date ,SOX is a 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑎11𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑎13 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑆𝑂𝑋 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board members, NONEXCi,t represents the percentage 
of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being independent, CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and 
CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, and  BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; 
R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the 
announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of 
the acquirer the year before the merger announcement; a0 is an intercept term; Cash is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for cash acquirers and 0 otherwise; Stock is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for stock acquirers and 0 otherwise; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors and given in 
parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 The actual values of the coefficients are -0.0000675, -0.0000675, 0.0000000312, 0.0000000312, -0.00000552, and -0.00000552 respectively, all reported as 
0.0000 to meet formatting requirements. The negative sign is kept next to the coefficients where appropriate to indicate the direction of the effect.
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Table 9: Multivariate Regression Results for Stock and Cash Subsamples
                                                
VARIABLES CAR (-1,0): STOCK CAR (-1,0): CASH CAR (-2,+2): STOCK CAR (-2,+2): CASH
Intercept 𝑎0 0.0540 (0.7390) -0.1030 (0.3820) -0.0648 (0.7990) -0.0200 (0.1520)
SOX 𝑎1 0.0140 (0.4940) 0.0060 (0.3360) 0.0490 (0.1210) 0.0930 (0.5830)
BRD_SIZE 𝑎2 0.1180 (0.1300) 0.0080 (0.7580) 0.1180 (0.4090) -0.0100 (0.7910)
NONEXC𝑎3 -0.0020* (0.0810) 0.0010 (0.1390) -0.0030 (0.3170) 0.0020** (0.0320)
INDEP𝑎4 0.0010 (0.2130) -0.0010* (0.0770) 0.0001 (0.9470) -0.0010* (0.0870)
CEO_DUAL𝑎5 -0.0420** (0.0340) -0.0030 (0.8530) -0.0440 (0.1570) -0.0130 (0.5540)
BRD_MTG𝑎6 0.0003 (0.9060) -0.0010 (0.5150) 0.0030 (0.4020) -0.0010 (0.4800)
SIZE𝑎7 -0.0140 (0.1920) 0.0030 (0.4740) 0.0030 (0.8300) 0.0090 (0.1040)
R_SIZE𝑎8 0.0000 (0.7410)1 -0.0000 (0.2720)2 -0.0000 (0.1540)3 -0.0000* (0.0890)4
MTBV𝑎9 -0.0020 (0.5950) -0.0003 (0.6060) -0.0090 (0.2360) 0.0001 (0.8930)
Observations 53 122 53 122
R-squared (%) 17.99 4.20 14.99 5.61
This table shows estimation results for model (4): = + + +  + + +𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7
+ + + , where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement date, SOX is a dummy 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board members, NONEXCi,t represents the 
percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being independent, CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking the value of 
1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, and  BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured 
by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of 
the acquirer the year prior to the announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio defined as the market value of the common equity divided 
by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger announcement; a0 is an intercept term; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are 
calculated using robust standard errors and are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively.
1, 2, 3, 4 The actual values of the coefficients are 0.00000191, -0.00000253, -0.0000105, and -0.00000504 respectively, all reported as 0.0000 to meet formatting 
requirements. The negative sign is kept next to the coefficients where appropriate to indicate the direction of the effect.
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         Table 10: Multivariate Results with Industry and Year Fixed Effects
VARIABLES CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2) CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2)
Intercept𝑎0 -0.0349 (0.5630) -0.0055 (0.9550) -0.0164 (0.8070) -0.0682 (0.5150)
𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑎1 0.0710*** (0.0090) 0.0720** (0.0420) 0.07330*** (0.009) 0.0739** (0.0450)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎2 0.0258 (0.3410) 0.0206 (0.6190) 0.0379 (0.2250) 0.0127 (0.7880)
 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3 -0.0007 (0.3170) -0.0004 (0.7560) -0.0007 (0.3300) -0.0000 (0.9820)1
 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4 0.0004 (0.4430) 0.0004 (0.6970) 0.0004 (0.4960) 0.0000 (0.92600)2
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑎5 -0.0054 (0.6250) -0.0217 (0.2170) -0.0046 (0.6910) -0.0286 (0.1130)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡𝑎6 -0.0016 (0.1980) -0.0017 (0.3840) -0.0014 (0.3610) -0.0023 (0.2590)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎7 -0.0025 (0.6120) 0.0063 (0.2100)
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑎9 -0.0010 (0.6780) -0.0044 (0.2880)
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎8 -0.0000 (0.354)3 -0.0000** (0.0150)4
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172 172 172 172
R-squared (%) 24.9 18.7 25.6 21.2
This table shows estimation results for model (4): = + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + + , where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition 𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
announcement date, SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total 
number of board members, NONEXCi,t represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers 
being independent, CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, BRD_MTG is the 
number of board meetings during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size 
of the bidding and target firm as defined by the ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the 
announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book 
value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger announcement; a0 is an intercept term; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are 
given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively
1, 2, 3, 4 The actual values of the coefficients are -0.0000310, 0.0000918, -0.00000250, and -0.00000868 respectively, all reported as 0.0000 to meet 
formatting requirements. The negative sign, where appropriate, is kept next to the coefficients to indicate the direction of the effect.
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 Table 11: Fixed Effects for Stock and Cash
VARIABLES CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2) CAR (-1,0) CAR (-2,+2)
Intercept𝑎0 0.0417 (0.518) 0.0303 (0.785) 0.0092 (0.889) -0.0244 (0.818)
𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑎1 0.0842** (0.033) 0.0892** (0.300) 0.0842** (0.011) 0.0892** (0.030)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎2 0.0322 (0.271) 0.0027 (0.952) 0.0322 (0.271) 0.0027 (0.952)
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝑎3 -0.0010 (0.198) -0.0004 (0.778) -0.0009 (0.198) -0.0004 (0.778)
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑎4 0.0004 (0.492)                        0.0000 (0.981)1 0.0004 (0.492) 0.0000 (0.981)2
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑎5 -0.0028 (0.812) -0.0257 (0.169) -0.0028 (0.812) -0.0257 (0.169)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡𝑎6 -0.0014 (0.370) -0.0023 (0.270) -0.0014 (0.370) -0.0023 (0.270)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎7 -0.0029 (0.543) 0.0056 (0.259) -0.0029 (0.543) 0.0056 (0.259)
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎8 -0.0000 (0.289)3 -0.0000*** (0.009)4 -0.0000 (0.289)5 -0.0000*** (0.009)6
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑎9 -0.0015 (0.551) -0.0051 (0.217) -0.0015 (0.551) -0.0051 (0.217)
Stock𝑎10 -0.0324** (0.017) -0.0547** (0.042)
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑎11 -0.0319 (0.206) -0.0496 (0.199)
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑎12 0.0324** (0.017) 0.0547** (0.042)
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑎13 -0.0319 (0.206) -0.0496 (0.199)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 172 172 172 172
R-squared (%) 28.7 24.9 28.7 24.9
This table shows estimation results for model (5): = + + +  + + + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+  where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition 𝑎8𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑎11𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑎13 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑆𝑂𝑋 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
announcement date, SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board 
members, NONEXCi,t represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being independent, 
CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings during 
the year; SIZEi,t is the size of the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by 
the ratio of the value of the transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the announceme t date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value 
(MTBV) ratio defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger 
announcement; a0 is an intercept term; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote 
two-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 The actual values of the coefficients are 0.0000214, 0.0000214, -0.00000279, -0.00000904, -0.00000904, and -0.00000904, respectively, all reported as 
0.0000 to meet formatting requirements. The negative sign is kept next to the coefficients where appropriate to indicate the direction of the effect.
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Table 12:  Year and Industry Fixed Effects for Stock and Cash Subsamples 









Intercept𝑎0 -0.0052 (0.9870) 0.0393 (0.4970) -0.2240 (0.6550) -0.0437 (0.7120)
𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑎1 0.1230* (0.0660) 0.0232 (0.2410) 0.1090 (0.2670) 0.0478 (0.2390)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎2 0.1380 (0.2730) -0.0115 (0.5680) 0.1980 (0.2930) -0.0583 (0.1580)
+  𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3 -0.0017 (0.5510) 0.0001 (0.7760) -0.0004 (0.9330) 0.0012 (0.2410)
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑎4 0.0007 (0.6730) -0.0003 (0.3750) 0.0023 (0.3500) -0.0007 (0.4030)
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑎5 -0.0554 (0.2740) 0.0195** (0.0420) -0.1350* (0.080) 0.0124 (0.5260)
𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡𝑎6 -0.0044 (0.3510) 0.0002 (0.8570) -0.0077 (0.2770) 0.0005 (0.8030)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎7 -0.0089 (0.5640) -0.0015 (0.6110) -0.0111 (0.6320) 0.0078 (0.1870)
𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑎8 0.0000 (0.3730)1 -0.0000** (0.015)2 0.0000 (0.7630)3 -0.0000** (0.0170)4
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑎9 -0.0006 (0.9440) 0.0004 (0.8490) -0.0207 (0.1310) 0.0027 (0.5090)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53 119 53 119
R-squared (%) 37.4 68.4 41.2 45.0
This table shows estimation results for model (4): = + + +  + + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎0 𝑎1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝑎2𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎3𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑎4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑎5𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝑎6
+ + + + , where  is the cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement date, 𝐵𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 𝑎7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎8𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑎9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the post-SOX period and 0 otherwise; BRD_SIZEi,t is the log of total number of board members, NONEXCi,t 
represents the percentage of non-executive board members; INDepi,t is the proportion of non-executive officers being independent, CEO_DUALi,t  is CEO duality 
taking the value of 1 if the Chairman and CEO is the same  and 0 otherwise, BRD_MTG is the number of board meetings during the year; SIZEi,t is the size of 
the acquirer as measured by the Log of its total assets; R_SIZEi,t captures relative size of the bidding and target firm as defined by the ratio of the value of the 
transaction to the Market Value  of the acquirer the year prior to the announcement date; and MTBVi,t is the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio defined as the 
market value of the common equity divided by the book value of the common equity of the acquirer the year before the merger announcement; a0 is an intercept 
term; and εi,t is the residual term. P-values are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.
1, 2, 3, 4 The actual values of the coefficients are 0.0000121, -0.00000593, 0.00000610, and -0.0000119, respectively, all reported as 0.0000 to meet formatting 
requirements. The negative sign is kept next to the coefficients where appropriate to indicate the direction of the effect. 
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